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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, : APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
(Plaintiff)Appellant, : 
-v- • 
JOHN PAINTER, : Case No. 86 0399 
Category 13b. 
(Defendant)Respondent. : 
ooOoo 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court committed reversible error 
in determining that no agistment bailment agreement existed 
between the parties; 
2. Whether the District Court committed reversible error 
in determining that Mr. Painter, a landowner, had no duty to 
check on, or report to Mr. Smurthwaite on the condition of, 
certain Appaloosa race-bred broodmares which Mr. Smurthwaite 
pastured, for a fee, on Mr. Painter's land; 
3. Whether the determinative findings of the District 
Court (regardless of whether they are styled "Findings of 
Fact" or "Conclusions of Law,") are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. Smurthwaite requests (1) that this Court determine 
that, as a matter of law, an agistment bailment agreement 
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existed between the parties; (2) that this Court determine 
that there is no support for the putative proposition that 
the subject horses would have died but for the negligence of 
Mr. Painter; (3) that this Court rule that, by reason of the 
existence of an agistment bailment agreement between the 
parties and by reason of Mr. Painter's failure to carry his 
burden of showing that he discharged his lawful duty of care 
and that the horses died by reason other than Mr. Painter's 
negligence, Mr. Smurthwaite's supposed negligence ought not to 
have been considered; and (4) that this Court reverse the 
District Court's Judgment and remand to the District Court 
with directions to enter Judgment for Mr. Smurthwaite and to 
make an appropriate damages determination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Smurthwaite, the plaintiff below, appeals from 
the Judgment of the District Court. Mr. Smurthwaite was an 
owner and breeder of race-bred Appaloosa horses. In the fall 
of 1981, he and Mr. Painter, an owner, lessee, or person 
otherwise in control of land located on the eastern shore of 
the Great Salt Lake in or near Syracuse, in Davis County, 
State of Utah, entered into an oral agreement, pursuant to 
which Mr. Smurthwaite brought his broodmare band to the 
property and, for a payment of $15.00 per head per month, 
received pasturage rights for his horses and, according to 
Mr. Smurthwaite's testimony below, the assurance that 
Mr. Painter, who lived adjacent to the property in question, 
- 7: -
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would keep his eye on the horses and let Mr. Smurthwaite know 
if any of the horses required attention. 
In the proceedings in the District Court, Mr. Smurthwaite 
pursued his claims against Mr. Painter, through trial, on two 
alternative theories: simple breach of contract and breach of 
an agistment bailment agreement, both arising from the death, 
during the winter of 1983-84, of ten of Mr. Smurthwaite's 
broodmares. The District Court found that the agreement was 
for pasturage only and ruled against Mr. Smurthwaite and in 
favor of Mr. Painter, no cause of action. Mr. Smurthwaite 
appeals therefrom. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that the following 
is a statement of undisputed facts material to the disposition 
of this Appeal: 
1. At all times material hereto, defendant-respondent 
John Painter owned, held as lessee under one or more lease 
agreements, or otherwise controlled certain land 350-390 acres 
in size (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the subject land") 
located near 1700 South State near the Great Salt Lake in or 
near Syracuse in Davis County, State of Utah. Record at 95. 
2. At all times material hereto, Mr. Painter, who has 
lived virtually his entire life in the immediate vicinity 
of the subject land, lived in a house adjacent to the subject 
land, and Mr. Smurthwaite lived in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, approximately 35 miles from the subject land. Record at 
- 7 -
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96; Tr., Vol. II, at 27. 
3. In the fall of 1981, Mr. Smurthwaite and Mr. Painter 
entered into an oral agreement, automatically renewable on a 
month-to-month basis, concerning Mr. Smurthwaite1s pasturing 
of his Appaloosa horses on the subject land. Record at 95. 
4. According to the terms of the said agreement, 
Mr. Smurthwaite was to pay to Mr. Painter $15.00 per head per 
month for each horse that Mr. Smurthwaite placed or caused to 
be placed on the subject land. Record at 95. 
5. In or about the fall of 1981 and from time to time 
thereafter, Mr. Smurthwaite, pursuant to the said agreement, 
placed and caused to be placed Appaloosa horses on the subject 
land, and through at least December 5, 1983, all such horses 
were in good flesh and not nearing starvation. Record at 95; 
Tr., Vol. II, at 37, 56, 135. 
6. At some time subsequent to the commencement of the said 
month-to-month relationship with Mr. Smurthwaite, Mr. Painter 
entered into an agreement with one Robert Child, according 
to the terms of which Mr. Child obtained the right to pasture 
his horses on part of the subject land. Record at 96. 
7. Mr. Painter was aware and Mr. Smurthwaite testified 
that he, Mr. Smurthwaite, was not aware, throughout at least 
late December, 1983, and January, 1984, and until the dead horses 
were found, in early February, 1984, of the uncontested facts: 
(a) that Mr. Childfs horses were, during that period, located 
on a portion of the subject land ("the upper pasture") 
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visible from the road (1700 South Street) adjacent to which 
Mr. Painter's house was located, and (b) that Mr. Smurthwaite's 
broodmares were located on a portion of the subject land that 
was not visible from the said road ("the lower pasture"). 
E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 270; Vol. Ill, at 5, 68-69. 
8. At all times material hereto, the upper pasture con-
tained and the lower pasture did not contain much of a grass 
known as "crested wheat grass," which grew tall enough to 
provide pasturage in inordinately severe winters. E.g., Tr., 
Vol. II, at 219. 
9. The winter of 1983-84 was an inordinately severe 
winter. Record at 131. 
10. Mr. Painter had heard, prior to Mr. Smurthwaite1s 
discovery of the dead horses, that other animals were starving 
to death in the vicinity of Mr. Painter's property and that 
the Humane Society was investigating. Tr., Vol. II, at 266-67. 
11. Mr. Smurthwaite did not set foot on the subject 
property from on or about December 5, 1983, until February 8, 
1984. Record at 131. 
12. Mr. Smurthwaite testified that he thought that 
Mr. Painter would let him know if the horses needed supple-
mental food in addition to that provided by the pasturage 
naturally available. E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 30, 31, 35; 
Vol. Ill, at 68-69. 
13. Mr. Smurthwaite paid Mr. Painter, pursuant to the 
subject agreement, sums of money, totaling in excess of 
- c; _ ' . . 
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$5,200.00. Tr., Vol. Ill, at 69. 
14. Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his agreed-upon 
monthly payments during the months of December, 1983 and 
January and February, 1984. E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 56-58, 
244-45, 268; Exhibits L, M, N. 
15. On a date or dates in late December, 1983, January, 
1984 and/or February, 1984, ten of Mr. Smurthwaitefs Appaloosa 
broodmares died of starvation in the lower pasture. Record at 
95. ; ' • 
16. All of Mr. Child's horses survived the winter of 
1983-84. Tr., Vol. II, at 271. 
17. After Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses were known to be dead, 
Mr. Painter informed Mr. Smurthwaite that Mr. Painter would 
retain custody of Mr. Smurthwaite1s surviving horses (also 
located on the subject land) until Mr. Smurthwaite became 
current on his payments. Tr., Vol. II, at 250. 
18. At the non-jury trial, held before the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, on May 21, 22, and 28, 1986, Mr. Smurthwaite 
put on expert testimony of damages in the approximate principal 
amount of $94,000.00 for the loss of his broodmares and their 
unborn foals. Tr., Vol. I, at 57-80, Exhibit X. 
19. At trial Mr. Painter put on testimony to show that 
the damages, if any, suffered by Mr. Smurthwaite were in the 
approximate principal amount of $9,000.00. Tr., Vol. Ill, at 
38."'' ' 
20. The District Court took the matter under advisement 
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and ultimately ruled and held on behalf of Mr. Painter, no 
cause of action. Record at 133. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Smurthwaite will not further pursue his simple breach-
of-contract claim, inasmuch as he accepts, for purposes of 
this Appeal, the fact that the District Court, as the trier of 
fact, accepted Mr. Painter's version, and not Mr. Smurthwaite's 
version, of the oral agreement between the parties. Speci-
fically, Mr. Smurthwaite understands that the office of this 
Appeal is not to re-try the issue of whether, as Mr. Smurthwaite 
contended below, Mr. Painter specifically and expressly under-
took to provide to Mr. Smurthwaite vigilance and information 
concerning any difficulties that might beset the horses. The 
District Court found, as Mr. Painter contended, that all 
Mr. Painter agreed to provide was use of the land and any 
pasturage that might be available on it. And, inasmuch as 
there was substantial evidence from Mr. Painter, to support 
the District Court's finding, with respect to Mr. Painter's 
express contractual undertaking, Mr. Smurthwaite will not 
further pursue his claim that he was, on a straight breach-
of-contract theory, entitled to relief. 
Mr. Smurthwaite's agistment bailment argument is another 
matter entirely. His pursuit of this Appeal is based on his 
contentions (1) that, as a matter of law and as a matter of 
public policy, the District Court clearly erred in determining 
that the agreement between Mr. Smurthwaite and Mr. Painter did 
- n _ 
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not constitute an agistment bailment agreement; (2) that 
Mr. Smurthwaite*s proof clearly satisfied the criteria for the 
triggering of burden-shifting mechanisms arising from agist-
ment bailment agreements; (3) that, as a matter of law, the 
burden thus fell on Mr. Painter to put on evidence supporting 
the proposition that he, Mr. Painter, was not negligent and 
that the horses did not die as a result of his (Mr. Painter's) 
negligence; (4) that the District Court may itself have 
impliedly recognized Mr. Painter's negligence; (5) that there 
is, in any event, no substantial record support for the propo-
sition that Mr. Painter was not negligent; (6) any putative 
finding of Mr. Painter's lack of negligence would be "clearly 
erroneous"; and (7) that the causational link between 
Mr. Painter's negligence and the death of the horses is not to 
be questioned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
WAS AN AGISTMENT BAILMENT AGREEMENT. 
A. The Significance of the District 
Court's Conclusion of Law 
For purposes of this Appeal, Mr. Smurthwaite accepts, as 
being based on substantial evidence, the District Court's 
Finding of Fact (record at 129 and 132) that Mr. Painter did 
not expressly agree to provide anything to Mr. Smurthwaite 
other than a place for Mr. Smurthwaite to pasture his horses. 
Mr. Smurthwaite does not, however, accept the District Court's 
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Conclusion of Law (record at 132) that "the agreement between 
the parties was not an agistment agreement . . . ." 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that the Conclusion was 
erroneous and that the success or failure of this Appeal 
appears to turn on the question of whether the District Court 
indeed erred in so concluding. 
B. The Law of Agistment Bailment 
"Agistment" has been variously defined as "the particu-
lar kind of bailment, under which a man, for consideration 
takes in cattle to graze and pasture on his land" (Bramlette 
v. Titus, 267 P.2d 620, 622 (Nev. 1954)); "the taking in and 
feeding or pasturing of horses, cattle, or similar animals for 
a reward" (Marcus v. Eastern Agr. Ass'n, Inc., 58 N.J. Super. 
584, 157 A.2d 3, 8 (N.J. App. 1959)); "a temporary pasturing 
arrangement" (Frazier v. Kern, 18 Wash.App. 93, 566 P.2d 956, 
958 (Wash. App. 1977)); "the pasturing of cattle or similar 
animals as a bailee in consideration of an agreed price to be 
paid by the owner [of the animals]" (3A C.J.S. Animals §46, 
p.514). 
Once it has been established that an agistment exists, 
certain burden-shifting legal machinery is put into gear. In 
Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983), for example, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained: 
It is well established that a contract to care for 
animals for a specified term, an agistment, is a 
"species of bailment," and that under such a 
contract "there is ordinarily an obligation to 
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return or account for the animals at the end of the 
term" (emphasis added). Failure to so account may 
result in the imposition of liability upon the bailee. 
In a recent and similar case involving an agistment 
of cattle, the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed 
the issue of a bailee's liability for unreturned and 
unaccounted for cattle: 
Under the law of bailment, if the property 
of the bailor is returned damaged or 
cannot be returned at all, the bailor, in 
order to recover against the bailee, must 
show that he first delivered the property 
in good condition. If that showing is 
made then there arises a presumption that 
the bailee is negligent and it casts upon 
the bailee the burden of going forward 
with evidence to overcome the presumption. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 320-21. In the Baker case, in which the Court 
found an agistment to have been created, the bailees had 
sought to recover monies allegedly due them from the defendant 
cattle owner pursuant to a pasturage agreement. The Court 
recognized the propriety of the plaintiffs' retaining posses-
sion of the cattle, pursuant to the agistors1 lien statute, 
Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1, until they had been paid. It is worth 
noting that, in the instant case, Mr. Painter, in knowing or 
unknowing reliance on that statute, demanded, after the deaths 
of Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses, that Mr. Smurthwaite pay monies 
due Mr. Painter before Mr. Smurthwaite's remaining horses 
would be released to Mr. Smurthwaite. Tr., Vol. II, at 250. 
Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428 P.2d 158 (1967) 
was another case involving an agistor's lien and an alleged 
breach of the contract of agistment. It appears that it was 
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uncontested, in Hughes, that the agreement between the parties 
was, as the District Court found the agreement between the 
parties in the instant case to be, one for pasturage only. 
428 P.2d at 159. In Hughes, the trial court found that the 
death of 18 of the plaintiff's cattle resulted from negligence 
of the defendants in failing to have adequate fences to prevent 
the escape of the cattle from the appropriate pasture area 
into areas containing green alfalfa (the consumption of which 
alfalfa apparently, in turn, caused the cattle to die of 
bloat). The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and conclu-
sions of the trial court, with the exception of the trial 
court's non-evidentiary-supported conclusion that appears 
(although there is no express discussion by the Court of such 
an analysis) to have flown in the face of the common law 
burden-shifting rule that was later expressly adopted in 
Baker. The Hughes Court concluded: 
We are of the opinion that it was error for the 
court to deduct the value of six head of cattle 
from the 18 upon the theory that experience would 
show that six would have died during the period in 
all events. 
428 P.2d at 159. 
In the instant case it is undisputed that Mr. Painter 
agreed, for consideration (or "reward"), to provide pasturage 
to plaintiff. Based on the law as set forth in Baker and by 
the facts and the Court's analysis in Hughes, an agistment 
bailment contract clearly existed. 
Cases from other jurisdictions finding that agistment 
- n -
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contracts inhered in pasturing arrangements include Ward v. 
Newell, 315 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. App. 1984) (wherein the court 
also observed that "ordinary care" was required of the 
agistor-bailee and restated the rule that such a degree of 
care is that "which men of ordinary prudence take of their own 
property of a similar kind under like circumstances." Id. at 
723); Cox v. Pithoud, 221 Cal.App. 2d 571, 34 Cal. Rptr. 582 
(1963) (wherein the court, in affirming the trial court, also 
held that the appellant, as an agistor, was liable for his 
negligence in connection with the loss to starvation of the 
appellee's cattle); and Vaughan v. Bixby, 142 Pac. 100 (Cal. 
App. 1914) wherein the court stated: 
One who takes in horses to pasture . . . is 
termed an agister . . . . While he is not an 
insurer against injury to or loss of the stock 
intrusted to his keeping, he is bound to take 
reasonable care thereof, and injury or loss 
resulting from ordinary casualties that could 
have been averted by the exercise of such 
reasonable care constitutes negligence for which 
he is responsible. 
See, also, 3A C.J.S. Animals §§40, et seq.; §§46, et seq. ; 
and 8 C.J.S. Bailments §§50, et seq. Also instructive is an 
article written by Murray Loring, D.V.M., J.D., appearing in 
the December 1983 edition of Appaloosa News, pp. 98-99, and 
entitled "Legal Aspects of a Horse Bailment." A copy of that 
article is, with Mr. Smurthwaite•s counsel's apologies for the 
highlightings and scribblings, made part of the Addendum 
hereto. 
- 1 9 -
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C. Allen v. Southern Pacific Co., 
Public Policy Considerations, 
the Agistors' Lien Statute 
and The Animal Cruelty Statute 
If the Court is hesitant expressly to adopt the pasturage-
for-reward standard for the creation of an agistment bailment 
relationship, or the "reasonable owner" rule for its applica-
tion, the Court is respectfully invited to consider the rule 
adopted by this Court given in the case of Allen v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 117 Utah 171, 213 P.2d 667 (1950). 
Allen was not an agistment bailment case but a lost-
traveling-bag-and-contents bailment case. Mr. Allen had 
checked with the railway company a bag and contents, of a 
total value found by the trial court to be $2,910.00, "which 
for a consideration was to be kept by respondent safely and 
securely until returned to appellant." 213 P.2d at 668. At the 
time Mr. Allen checked the bag he was given a receipt, on one 
side of which was printed a legend purporting to limit the 
railway's liability to $25.00. To the same effect was a sign 
posted in the room where Mr. Allen checked the bag. The trial 
court found that Mr. Allen read neither the receipt nor the 
sign and that the railway's agents did not call to Mr. Allen's 
attention the contents of either notice. The trial court also 
found that the railway "failed to take due care of or safely 
keep" (id.) Mr. Allen's property and instead gave the property 
to another person. The trial court determined that the railway 
company's liability was contractually limited to $25.00. 
- 13 -
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Mr. Allen appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on the 
question of whether the trial court correctly ruled that his 
entitlement to damages was so limited. The Court observed: 
Ordinarily, a bailee for hire is responsible for 
the value of the goods entrusted to him if it is 
lost or destroyed. However, the parties may enter 
into a valid agreement to modify the obligations 
which would otherwise arise from the relationship 
of bailor and bailee if it ". . . does not violate 
the law or contravene public policy, and so long as 
it is actually a part of the contract of bailment 
and is expressed in clear and unmistakable 
language . . . ." [Citations omitted.] The great 
weight of authority is that a bailee cannot 
entirely exempt himself by contract from liability 
due to his negligence and contracts limiting his 
liability for negligence during the course of a 
general business with the public are usually 
regarded as being against the public policy. 
[Citations omitted.] 
Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court went on to rule in Mr. Allen's 
favor, reversing the trial court and remanding with instructions 
that Mr. Allen be granted judgment for the full $2,190.00. 
213 P.2d at 670. 
Mr. Smurthwaite concedes that the Allen Court's analysis 
did not deal expressly with public policy considerations, but, 
rather, was based on the trial court's findings that Mr. Allen 
had no actual knowledge of the purported limitation on 
liability and that the limitation language was not called to 
his attention. Mr. Smurthwaite also recognizes that, strictly 
speaking, even the dictum reference in Allen to public policy 
considerations may be meaningless in the absence of this 
Court's determination that the arrangement between the parties 
hereto constituted an agistment bailment. Mr. Smurthwaite 
1 A 
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suggests, nonetheless, that that reference provides an 
analytical springboard for this Court's consideration of the 
very important public policy concerns that are at the heart of 
this Appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 provides and has, at all times 
material hereto, provided: 
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, 
tavern keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any 
domestic animals shall be entrusted for the purpose 
of feeding, herding or pasturing shall have a lien 
upon such animals for the amount that may be due him 
for such feeding, herding or pasturing and is 
authorized to retain possession of such animals 
until such amount is paid. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As indicated in items 14 and 15 of the Statement of 
Facts appearing hereinabove, it is not disputed that, as 
of the time or times, in December of 1983, January of 1984, 
or very early February of 1984, that Mr. Smurthwaite's 
horses died, Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his payment 
obligation to Mr. Painter. And, though the record is 
silent as to whether he was consciously aware of his 
express statutory right, Mr. Painter himself exercised 
his agistor's lien right, with respect to certain of 
Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses that somehow avoided starvation. 
Tr., Vol. Ill, at 17. 
Research has failed to unearth any case or other 
authority on point, but Mr. Smurthwaite suggests that 
Mr. Painter's statutory right to retain possession of the 
- m -
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horses at the time or times of their deaths may consti-
tute "custody" of the animals, at least for purposes of 
the public policy concerns inherent herein. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 provides and has, at all times 
material hereto, provided, in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits cruelty to animals if he 
intentionally or knowingly . . . 
(b) Fails to provide necessary food, care, 
or shelter for an animal in his custody; or 
(c) Abandons an animal in his custody . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Smurthwaite does not suggest that persons in 
Mr. Painter's position should be prosecuted for cruelty 
to animals in connection with events such as those involved 
herein. He recognizes that, for criminal prosecution 
purposes, the step-by-step analysis suggested herein 
would, in all likelihood, not be accepted. For example, 
regardless of Mr. Painter's legal right, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §38-2-1, to refuse any putative request by 
Mr. Smurthwaite for release of the horses when payments 
for their pasturing were overdue, no such request was 
made prior to the horses' starvation. Nor is it likely 
that the "intentionally or knowingly" standard of the 
animal cruelty statute could be satisfied in a case such 
as this, wherein Mr. Painter has testified that he thought, 
while the horses were dwindling toward their deaths, that 
Mr. Smurthwaite was "checkin1 on 'em." Tr., Vol. Ill, at 
- l 6 -
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15. Given facts such as these, it is most unlikely that 
a prosecutor would seek conviction of Mr. Painter under either 
§76-9-301(1)(b) or (c). 
The facts remain, however, 
(1) that Mr. Painter had, for virtually his entire 
life and during the 1983-84 winter, lived in the immediate 
vicinity of where Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses were pastured and 
died (Record at 96; Tr., Vol. II, at 27); 
(2) that Mr. Smurthwaite lived in Murray, Salt Lake 
County (some 30-35 miles from the property) during the winter 
of 1983-84 (Record at 131); 
(3) that Mr. Painter knew that Mr. Smurthwaite1s 
horses were in an area where they were not readily observable 
(E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 270; Vol. Ill, at 5); 
(4) that that area did not have sufficient tall, 
crested wheat grass that might be expected to provide suffi-
cient nourishment for Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses in severe 
winter weather and snow cover (E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 219); 
and 
(5) that Mr. Painter was aware that the winter of 
1983-84 was "the worst winter in quite a few winters" (Tr., 
Vol. Ill, at 15). 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that it is facts 
such as these that shine the spotlight on public policy 
concerns that might otherwise continue to lie in the shadows 
of our jurisprudence for decades longer than they have already 
- 1 7 -
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lain- Specifically, Mr. Smurthwaite suggests that Mr. Painter's 
unquestioned knowledge of the whereabouts of the horses and 
of the unavailability to them, in that location, during that 
winter, of natural pasturage, constitutes precisely the kind 
of knowledge that bailees in the non-agistment context typi-
cally have and that their counterpart bailors typically do not 
have. Mr. Smurthwaite submits, further, that the public 
policy of the State of Utah, embodied in manifestations such 
as the animal cruelty statute, would be, for the bailment 
analysis purposes mentioned in Allen and otherwise, served by 
this Court's express adoption of the rule that an agreement 
for "pasturage only" constitutes an agistment bailment and 
imposes on the agistor-bailee the concomitant duty of care. 
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully suggests that, if this Court 
declines to do so, in the rubric of Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1, 
M[e]very ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, tavern 
keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any domestic animals 
shall be entrusted for the purpose of . . . pasturing" may, 
with impunity and in the face of the policies clearly under-
lying the animal cruelty statute, receive and bank the money 
of the owner of livestock and not be answerable in damages to 
that owner for even the most blatantly negligent act or omis-
sion. A person in Mr. Painter's position might, for example, 
be able to receive payments from a person such as 
Mr. Smurthwaite and, without fear of civil liability, 
literally sit comfortably on a porch swing drinking a beer or 
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a Coca-Cola and watching that person's horse or cow being 
tortured or painfully starving to death. Would a "reasonable 
owner" of the horse or cow do that? Does the public policy of 
the State of Utah countenance such a result? 
POINT II 
ALL ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TRIGGER THE 
BURDEN SHIFTING MECHANISM OF AGISTMENT 
BAILMENT AGREEMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED. 
If the Court does not accept the foregoing agistment 
bailment analysis or otherwise come to the conclusion that an 
agistment bailment agreement existed between the parties 
hereto, there is, in all likelihood, no purpose to be served 
by the Court's further consideration of this Appeal. If, on 
the other hand, the Court is persuaded that, as a matter of 
law and contrary to the District Court's conclusion, the 
parties' relationship was one of that description, it follows 
inexorably that Mr. Smurthwaite should prevail on this Appeal. 
As the New Mexico Supreme Court has observed in New 
Mexico Feeding Co. v. Keck, 95 N.M. 615, 624 P.2d 1012, 1017 
(1981), a case involving an agistment of cattle (which rule 
of law has, as indicated hereinabove, been expressly approved 
by this Court in Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315, 320-21 (Utah 
1983)) : 
Under the law of bailment, if the property of the 
bailor . . . is returned damaged or cannot be 
returned at all, the bailor, in order to recover 
against bailee, must show that he first delivered 
the property in good condition. If that showing is 
made then there arises a presumption that the 
bailee is negligent and it casts upon the bailee 
the burden of going forward with evidence to 
overcome the presumption. 
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It is clear beyond cavil (1) that Mr. Smurthwaite1s 
horses died (could "not be returned at all"), (see, e.g., 
Record at 95); and (2) that Mr. Smurthwaite delivered the 
horses "in good condition" (see, e.g., Tr., Vol. Ill, at 37, 56). 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT FIND THAT 
MR. PAINTER WAS NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT 
A FACTOR OTHER THAN HIS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED 
THE DEATH OF MR. SMURTHWAITE'S HORSES. 
The next appropriate step in the analysis is to determine 
what the District Court had to say concerning Mr. Painter's 
negligence, or the lack thereof. A review of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (record at 128-133) in this regard 
is most instructive. The only finding in this regard is 
denominated a conclusion of law. It is unnumbered and it 
appears at pages 132 and 133 of the record. It immediately 
follows this Conclusion of Law: 
The Court further concludes that the defendant had 
no duty to care for the livestock or inspect the 
animals nor even to report on their condition under 
the circumstances of this case. 
It consists of the following: 
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and 
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out 
that duty, the Court would conclude that plaintiff 
in failing to inspect his stock from December 5, 
1983, to February 7, 1984, was negligent himself and 
that said negligence was at least equal to, if not 
greater, than that of the defendant. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Smurthwaite suggests that the District Court's own 
implicit finding that Mr. Painter was negligent may, in and of 
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itself, herald the end of the inquiry. For, as this Court 
appears to have recognized in Baker v. Hansen, if the bailee 
(Mr. Painter) has failed (as he appears to have) to carry his 
burden of showing that he was not negligent, the District Court 
(subject to this Court's acceptance of the foregoing agistment 
bailment law analysis) should have ruled in Mr. Smurthwaite's 
favor. If there is any doubt, for purposes of actual and 
proximate cause analysis, concerning Mr. Smurthwaite's entitle-
ment to the relief requested herein, the Court is invited to 
consider from a common sense perspective and from an uncon-
tested evidentiary perspective (see, e.g., Tr., Vol. Ill, at 
68-69) the fact that Mr. Smurthwaite would have, had he known 
of the danger, gotten current on his payments and moved his 
horses to a location where they would not have starved to 
death. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL RECORD SUPPORT 
FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT MR. PAINTER 
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT OR FOR THE PROPOSITION 
THAT HIS NEGLIGENT OMISSION TO NOTIFY 
MR. SMURTHWAITE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE DEATHS OF MR. SMURTHWAITE'S 
HORSES. 
Mr. Smurthwaite is aware of the standard of review of 
this Court pertaining to District Court Findings of Fact. He 
also recognizes that it would likely be a matter of elevating 
form over substance for him to attack the District Court's 
Judgment on the basis that it appears erroneously to have 
denominated what appear to be findings of fact as conclusions 
~ oi -
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of law. In the event, therefore, that the District Court is 
determined to have found, regardless of what appears to be its 
finding to the contrary, that Mr. Painter was not negligent, 
Mr. Smurthwaite endeavors to set forth, in the succeeding 
paragraphs, the paucity of the record evidence in support of 
such a finding. 
It is not disputed that Mr. Painter never notified or 
sought to notify Mr. Smurthwaite, during the particularly 
harsh winter in question (see, e.g., tr., Vol. Ill, at 
48-49), that he, Mr. Smurthwaite, ought to check on, or have 
Mr. Painter check on, the conditions of his horses. 
Mr. Painter's contention that he was not negligent in 
failing so to notify Mr. Smurthwaite appears to be based 
solely on his claim that, as indicated hereinabove, he thought 
Mr. Smurthwaite was "checkin1 on 'em," and that that surmise 
was reasonable. The universe of arguable record support for 
that contention appears to consist of the following: 
(a) that, according to the testimony of Mr. Painter's 
witness, Robert Child (admitted over hearsay objection, allowed 
on what District Court found to be a "state of mind" exception), 
Mr. Painter stated that he thought Mr. Smurthwaite was "checking 
on" the horses; (Tr., Vol. II, at 184); 
(b) that Mr. Painter may have thought that 
Mr. Smurthwaite was able to climb over a sewage treatment 
plant fence to check on the condition of his horses (Tr., 
Vol. II, at 220-225); 
_ oo _ 
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(c) that Mr. Painter testified that he, himself, 
would have gone down to check on the horses if he had not 
thought that Mr. Smurthwaite was checking on them (Tr., 
Vol. II, at 244); 
(d) that Mr. Painter testified that he said to 
Mr. Smurthwaite shortly before Mr. Smurthwaite discovered that 
his horses had died: "Haven't you been checking your horses? 
That's your responsibility." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 245.) (That 
statement was made, if it was made, on February 5, 1984 (tr., 
Vol. II, at 60) when the horses were, in all likelihood, 
already dead (see, Tr., Vol. II, at 135; Vol. Ill, at 47-48, 
54) . ) ; and 
(e) that Mr. Painter testified that he would have 
called Mr. Smurthwaite if he had actually seen horses with 
their ribs sticking out, but that he "figured [Mr. Smurthwaite] 
was checkin' on fem." (Tr., Vol. Ill, at 15). 
The fact remains that Mr. Painter, who knew horses could 
die of starvation (tr., Vol. II, at 263), and who heard that 
animals were starving to death and that the Humane Society was 
investigating (tr., Vol. II, at 266-67), did absolutely nothing, 
did not even pick up his telephone (tr., Vol. II, at 267) to 
discharge his duty of care to Mr. Smurthwaite. 
Mr. Smurthwaite contends (1) that these pieces of evi-
dence do not, individually or in the aggregate, provide the 
traditionally requisite "substantial support" for the District 
Court's putative finding that Mr. Painter was not negligent; 
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and (2) that application of the "clearly erroneous" standard 
suggested for adoption in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 
711 P.2d 250, 252-53, n.2 (Utah 1985) would, a fortiori, lead 
to the conclusion that such a putative finding be rejected. 
Finally, and, as indicated hereinabove (at p. 21), and 
lest the Court have any doubt, the evidence adduced at trial 
clearly supports the proposition, for actual and proximate 
causation purposes, that the deaths of the horses would not 
have occurred but for Mr. Painter's negligent failure to 
inform Mr. Smurthwaite of the condition of the horses. 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the parties was an agistment bail-
ment. Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses were delivered to Mr. Painter's 
property in good condition and were in good condition the last 
time Mr. Smurthwaite saw them. The horses died. Mr. Painter 
failed to demonstrate that he was not negligent (or that he 
acted as a "reasonable owner" would have) in connection with 
the events pertinent hereto and to the deaths of the horses. 
There was, accordingly and as a matter of agistment bailment law, 
no reason for the District Court to consider Mr. Smurthwaite's 
supposed negligence in failing to inspect his horses. Had 
Mr. Smurthwaite known what was happening, his horses would not 
have starved to death. 
Mr. Smurthwaite was entitled to Judgment in the District 
Court proceedings and remains so entitled, in an amount to be 
determined on remand, based on the principal amount of the 
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values of Mr- Smurthwaite1s horses as of December, 1983, plus 
interest accruing thereon subsequent thereto, plus compensable 
costs- And Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully urges this Court so 
to rule. 
DATED this ^'J^r^day of October, 1986^ . 
WINDER & 
By: 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for (Plaintiff) 
Appellant 
"LODGING" CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that, on October 20, 1986, I "lodged" 
with the Court, pursuant to procedures explained to me by a 
representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Utah Supreme 
Court, a nearly final draft of the foregoing Appellant's Brief 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ^2Wday of October, 1986, 
I caused four copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to be 
mailed to Taylor D. Carr, Esq., 350 South 400 East, Suite 114, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE : 
Plaintiff, : RULING 
vs. : 
JOHN PAINTER, : Case No. 2-36259 
Defendant, : 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court and the Court having heard the 
testimony of the witnesses and having reviewed the evidence 
herein, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby rules as 
follows: 
1. That defendant Painter owns and leases certain property 
in Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. That the land in question is divided into one 40 acre 
cultivated parcel with approximately 10 acres of pasture referred 
to as the upper pasture and a second 350 acre parcel consisting 
of pasture referred to as the lower pasture. The parcels are 
separated by a large drainage ditch running approximately east 
and west. 
3. The plaintiff is an experienced horseman having been 
involved in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68. 
FILMED 
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4. The plaintiff, in addition to his experience, has taken 
many classes on horse care and was aware that a horse could die 
in two to four weeks from starvation. 
5. That the defendant is not an experienced horseman. 
6. That defendant resides adjacent to the upper pasture. 
7. That the lower pasture is not observable from the barn 
area or the home on the upper pasture. 
8. That the plaintiff and defendant entered into an 
agreement whereby it was agreed that plaintiff could pasture his 
horses on defendant's property for $15.00 per head payable at the 
end of each month. 
9. That the defendant had no responsibility to feed or 
check the horses or even to maintain fences. 
10. That plaintiff had free access to property to come and 
go as warranted and to move the horses in and out as he saw fit 
with no contact or interference with from the defendant. 
11. That the agreement was from month to month. 
12. That the horses were brought by the plaintiff and 
placed on the upper pasture in October of 1981. 
13. That the horses were moved down on the lower pasture in 
the spring of 1982. 
14. That it is not clear from the evidence who moved them. 
15. Plaintiff made no objection to the fact that the horses 
were on the lower pasture. 
16. That the lower pasture had good grass and water. 
ii 
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17. That in the fall of 1982, 300 head of yearling sheep 
were placed on the upper pasture by one, Childs, and then in 
November of 1982 through April of 1983, 600 to 700 head of sheep 
and 4 head of horses and a trailer were placed on the property by 
Mr. Marriot all of which was authorized by the defendant. 
18. That in the fall of 1983, 120 head of sheep were placed 
on the upper pasture by Mr. Childs from October until December 24 
and 7 to 10 head of horses were placed on the same parcel from 
November of 1983 to April of 1984. 
19. That plaintiff testified that he inspected his horses 
every day in the fall and winter of 1981 and 1982; then 3 to 4 
times each week. That he observed the sheep in the north 
pasture. The same was testified to also by plaintiff's nephew. 
20. During the winter of 1982 and 1983 plaintiff inspected 
the horses at least 12 times over the winter. 
21. The horses remained in the lower pasture from the 
spring of 1982 until they were taken out in June of 1984 and 
plaintiff at no time ever objected to their being in the lower 
pasture. 
22. The winter of 1983-84 was a very severe winter. 
23. That the plaintiff at all times relevant to this matter 
resided in Murray, Utah. 
24. The snow began falling in November of 1983. 
25. That plaintiff inspected the horses on December 5, 
1983, in the lower pasture and never inspected the horses again 
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until February 4, 1984, and then only from the road where he 
could not identify his horses as they were too far away, 
26. That plaintiff finally on February 7, 1984 walked down 
in the lower pasture to inspect his horses and found several 
d e a d . • •••.•.-,
 s:.:<, 
27. Plaintiff never at any time complained to defendant 
about the horses being in the lower pasture or about other 
livestock being in the upper pasture. 
28. The lower pasture had three means of access; one 
through the defendant's farm, one through the sewer plant 
property and one on the south end of the 350 acre parcel by 
Miller pond. 
29. The sewer plant access was paved and was kept plowed in 
the winter. 
30. That the plaintiff had used the sewer plant access at 
least six times prior to the 1983-84 winter to move the horse in 
and out. •?;•,. 
31. That plaintiff, upon finding his dead horses, indicated 
to defendant that he had "goofed up" allowing the horses to die 
and was about out of the horse business. 
32. That defendant was working full-time at his regular job 
during the winter of 1983-84 as he had at all times previous and 
during that winter never went into the fields and never saw any 
of plaintiff's horses. 
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From the foregoing the Court concludes that the agreement 
between the parties was one for pasturage rental only. That 
defendant had no responsibility to feed or care for plaintiff's 
animals nor to inspect them or even repair the fences. 
That the said agreement did not apply to any particular 
parcel of defendant's land. 
The Court concludes that the agreement between the parties 
was not an agistment agreement which requires in all cases that 
the person sought to be charged has some contractual 
responsibility for the care of the livestock. 
The Court concludes that the defendant did not breach the 
agreement between the parties. 
The Court further concludes that the defendant had no duty 
to care for the livestock or inspect the animals nor even to 
report on their condition under the circumstances of this case. 
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and 
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out that duty, 
the Court would conclude that plaintiff in failing to inspect his 
stock from December 5, 1983, to February 7, 1984, was negligent 
himself and that said negligence was at least equal to, if not 
greater, than that of the defendant. 
From the foregoing the Court grants judgment to the 
defendant and dismisses plaintiff's complaint for no cause of 
action. 
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Defendant's counsel to prepare Findings and Judgment in 
accordance with the Court's ruling. 
DATED this |q~Hv day of June, A.D. 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
(rti\ ys<*-District /Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Ruling to Peter Collins, 175 West 200 South, Suite 
4004, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to Taylor D. Carr, 350 
South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 postage 
prepaid on the /f day of June, A.D^, 1986. 
Deputy Clerk 
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TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Defendant 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, i 
Plaintiff, < 
VS. ' 
JOHN PAINTER, 
Defendant. I 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 2-36259 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
before the above-entitled Court on May 21, 1986, and the 
Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and having 
reviewed the evidence herein, and being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby finds and rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant Painter owns and leases certain pro-
perty in Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. That the land in question is divided into one 40 
acre cultivated parcel with approximately 10 acres of pasture 
referred to as the upper pasture and a second 350 acre parcel 
consisting of pasture referred to as the lower pasture. 
The parcels are separated by a large drainage ditch running 
approximately east and west, 
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3. The plaintiff is an experienced horseman having 
been involved in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68. 
4. The plaintiff, in addition to his experience, has 
taken many classes on horse care and was aware that a horse 
could die in two to four weeks from starvation. 
5. That the defendant is not an experienced horseman. 
6. That defendant resides adjacent to the upper pasture. 
7. That the lower pasture is not observable from the 
barn area or the home on the upper pasture. 
8. That the plaintiff and defendant entered into an 
agreement whereby it was agreed that plaintiff could pasture 
his horses on defendant's property for $15.00 per head payable 
at the end of each month. 
9. That the defendant had no responsibility to feed 
or check the horses or even maintain fences. 
10. That plaintiff had free access to property to come 
and go as warranted and to move the horses in and out as 
he saw fit with no contact or interference with or from the 
defendant. 
11. That the agreement was from month to month. 
12. That the horses were brought by the plaintiff and 
placed on the upper pasture in October of 1981. 
13. That the horses were moved down on the lower pasture 
in the Spring of 1982. 
14. That it is not clear from the evidence who moved 
2 " 
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them. 
15. Plaintiff made no objection to the fact that the 
horses were on the lower pasture. 
16. That the lower pasture had good grass and water. 
17. That in the Fall of 1982, 300 head of yearling 
sheep were placed on the upper pasture by one, ChiIds, and 
then in November of 1982 through April of 1983, 600 to 700 
head of sheep and 4 head of horses and a trailer were placed 
on the property by Mr. Marriot all of which was authorized 
by the defendant. 
18. That in the Fall of 1983, 120 head of sheep were 
placed on the upper pasture by Mr. ChiIds from October until 
December 24 and 7 to 10 head of horses were placed on the 
same parcel from November of 1983 to April of 1984. 
19. That plaintiff testified that he inspected his 
horses every day in the Fall and Winter of 1981 and 1982; 
then 3 to 4 times each week. That he observed the sheep 
on the north pasture. The same was testified to also by 
plaintiff's nephew. 
20. During the Winter of 1982 and 1983 plaintiff in-
spected the horses at least 12 times over the Winter. 
21. The horses remained in the lower pasture from the 
Spring of 1982 until they were taken out in June 1984 and 
plaintiff at no time ever objected to their being in the 
lower pasture. 
3 . :' 
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22. The winter of 1983-84 was a very severe winter. 
23. That the plaintiff at all times relevant to this 
matter resided in Murray, Utah. 
24. The snow began falling in November of 1983. 
25. That plaintiff inspected the horses on December 
5, 1983, in the lower pasture and never inspected the horses 
again until February 4, 1984 and then only from the road 
where he could not identify his horses as they were too far 
away. ':s 
26. That plaintiff finally on February 7, 1984 walked 
down in the lower pasture to inspect his horses and found 
several dead. 
27. Plaintiff never at any time complained to defendant 
about the horses being in the lower pasture or about other 
livestock being in the upper pasture. 
28. The lower pasture had three means of access; one 
through the defendant's farm, one through the sewer plant 
property and one on the south end on the 350 acre parcel 
by Miller pond. 
29. The sewer plant access was paved and was kept plowed 
in the winter. 
30. That the plaintiff had used the sewer plant access 
at least six times prior to the 1983-84 winter to move the 
horses in and out. 
31. That plaintiff, upon finding his dead horses, in-
x 
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dicated to defendant that he had "goofed up" allowing the 
horses to die and was about out of the horse business. 
32. That defendant was working full-time at this regular 
job during the winter of 1983-84 as he had at all times pre-
vious and during that winter never went into the fields and 
never saw any of plaintiff's horses. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing the Court concludes that the agreement 
between the parties was one for pasturage rental only. That 
defendant had no responsibility to feed or care for plaintiff's 
animals nor to inspect them or even repair the fences. 
That the said agreement did not apply to any particular 
parcel of defendant's land. 
The Court concludes that the agreement between the parties 
was not an agistment agreement which requires in all cases 
that the person sought to be charged has some contractual 
responsibility for the care of the livestock. 
The Court concludes that the defendant did not breach 
the agreement between the parties. 
The Court further concludes that the defendant had no 
duty to care for the livestock or inspect the animals nor 
even to report on their condition under the circumstances 
of this case. 
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and 
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out that 
..
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duty, the Court would conclude that plaintiff in failing 
to inspect his stock from December 5, 1983, to February 7, 
1984, was negligent himself and that said negligence was 
at least equal to, if not greater, than that of the defendant. 
From the foregoing the Court concludes that judgment 
should be granted to the defendant and plaintiff's complaint 
should be dismissed for no cause of action. 
DATED this /fffo day of ^-LJL , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
&.~J- Q^ 
RODtfEY S. IP5GE S 
District^Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, postage prepaid this #3 day of 
1986, to: 
Peter Collins 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582 
Attorney for Defendant 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN PAINTER, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 2-36259 
The above entitled matter having been duly tried, on 
May 21, 22 and 28, 1986, without jury, the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page, District Court Judge, presiding, the parties having 
been represented by their respective counsel, Peter C. Collins 
for plaintiff, and Taylor D. Carr for defendant, and the 
court having heard the testimony of witnesses and having 
reviewed the evidence presented, and upon due consideration, 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor 
of defendant and against plaintiff and plaintiff's complaint 
is hereby dismissed for no cause of action with prejudice, 
and upon the merits. 
DATED t h i s ) f l ^ day of 4 u i 
T 
, 1 9 8 6 . 
BY THE COURT: 
A P RODNEY S jPAGE, D i s t r i c t Judge £ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing JUDGMENT, postage prepaid this 
#3 day of (\z4snJU , 1986, to: 
Peter Collins 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Legal Aspects Of A Horse Bailment 
Before we delve into the different phases of a bailment, let's 
determine the meaning of this term. In its broadest definition bail-
ment is the lawful possession of an animal by someone other than 
the owner. Examples of a bailment are: a stallion that spends but 
one day on another's ranch; a rider who rents a horse for a few 
hours of pleasure; a horse is boarded on a monthly basis. In all 
the aforementioned circumstances, possession of the equine is 
in the hands of someone who is not its legal owner. 
Now that the bailee (one who receives and has possession of 
the animal) is the "holder" of the horse, what are his basic obliga-
tions? First, he is to properly care and tend to the animal; second, 
he is to see that no harm befalls the animal while in his custody; 
and third, the horse is to be returned to the bailor (legal owner 
of the horse) in as good a condition as when originally entrusted 
to him. 
As there are obligations imposed on the bailee, there are stipula-
tions the bailor is to recognize. If the horse is let for a trail ride, 
the bailor implies that the animal is capable of performing the 
journey for which it was let. When the horse is bailed, the owner 
is obligated to inform the bailee of any habits of the aiiimal with 
respect to safety of the bailee and the safety of others. If the bailor 
does not fulfill any of his obligations, he is in breach of a bailment. 
In a bailment there is a relationship between the parties which 
normally arises by an expressed agreement, either written or oral. 
In certain situations, however, a bailment will be implied as a 
result of the circumstance. For example, when a horse is rented 
for a ride a bailment is created as a matter of law. This is so even 
in the absence of any agreement or discussion between the parties. 
For the creation of a bailment two elements are a must. First, 
there is to be a physical delivery of the equine to the bailee; and 
second, there has to be a knowing acceptance of the horse by the 
bailee. Let's look at two examples to see the difference: 
{a) Mr. Smith, owner of a horse, contacts Mr. Jones, who agrees 
to keep the horse for the summer for a fee of $ 100 per mcnth. A 
Mr. Jones is late in picking up the horse and, in the interval, 
the horse is injured before Mr. Jones arrives. Even though an 
agreement exists, because there has been no physical transfer 
• or the bailee's possession, no bailment has as yet ar i sen .^ 
(b) Mr. Smith, owner of a horse, delivers the horse to Mr. Jones' 
ranch without prior contact with Mr. Jones—Mr. Jones is away. 
Jones discoveres the horse the next day. At this point there 
is no bailment because there has been no knowing acceptance 
by the bailee, Mr. Jones. If a subsequent agreement is reach-
ed on suitable terms the bailment will immediately commence. 
Prior to agreement, Mr. Jones would be in a position of an in-
voluntary bailee, with no duty of care toward the horse. 
Since the bailor is parting with physical possession of the horse, 
his duties are fairly limited. His primary duty is to provide the 
proper type of horse to the bailee. This duty is expressed in terms 
of an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose of 
the bailment. The law will implythis warranty even in the absence 
of any discussion amongst the parties. Thus,'when the bailor 
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represents to the bailee that the riding horse is of gentle disposi-
tion when, in fact, the bailor knows the contrary, the bailor has 
breached an implied warranty of fitness for the particular pur-
pose and breached the bailment. 
This warranty of fitness is not an insurance agreement. The 
warranty is to take into account the nature of the horse and the 
expectation of the bailee. In a California court proceeding, 
"an owner, furnishing a horse for hire, was not required to in-
form the rider that the horse was a jumper nnW<; there was reason 
to believe that the horse would jump when not feeing a 
hurdle . . . " 
As might be expected, since the bailee has physical possession 
of the horse, his duties are more numerous and detailed. One of 
the duties of a bailee is to return the bailed animal, either * t« 
set time or on demand, to the bailor or someone designated by 
\the bailor, in at least as good a condition as it was received. 
The majority of problems arise over the question of the bailee's 
-duty of care toward the horse in his physical possession. The term 
"care" is not just the obligation of providing adequate food, water 
and shelter, but the general obligation to refrain from any behavior 
which could result in harm to the bailed horse. 
As to what is reasonable care, some factors that ought to be con-
sidered are: 
—the nature and purpose of the bailment, whether it is for pay 
or a gratuitous gesture; 
—the pedigree and/or value of the equine; 
—any special duties within the bailment agreement; 
—the prior practice between the parties and the practice of bail-
ment in the particular area; 
—any special knowledge that is to be disclosed by bailor to 
bailee; and 
—any special needs of the horse to be made known to bailee^ 
While the bailee is to observe the above, he must comply with 
\me nihiimum standards of a horse hailr^^pt lill I hiatal mill 
* adequate food, water and shelter. This, however, does riot make 
the bailee an insurer of the horse. If unusual cr extraordinary 
events occur, the bailee's duty is to contact the bailor and get fur-
ther instructions. For example; whereas ordinary veterinary ex-J 
penses may be part of bailee's duty, if an unusual illness or acci-
dent occurs, the bailee may not have the duty to incur large or 
abnormally high veterinary expenses. The proper course for the 
bailee would be to contact the bailor. 
The easiest situation for the bailor is when the bailee delivers 
the bailed horse to a third party without authorization from the 
bailor. At this point the bailee is liable for the value of the horse. 
This is so, as the bailee is under an absolute duty to redeliver the 
horse to thW bailor. 
The majority of bailment cases to reach the courtroom are a 
result of injury or death to the animal while in possession of the 
bailee. In a predicament of this sort the bailor merely has to show 
'that (1) the existence of a bailment between the parties; (2) delivery 
|of the animal to the possession of the bailee; and (3) failure of 
le bailee to redeliver the animal undamaged. 
• H 
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Once the bailor has shown these facts, a presumption of 
negligence is cast against the bailee. An Ohio court proceeding 
^exemplified this point, saying (paraphrased): "Owner of a mare 
\ brings the animal to bailee's ranch for breeding existed, a delivery 
^J and subsequent injury and death of the bailed mare allows a 
/ presumption of negligence on the part of the bailee.'" 
/ Now it is up to the bailee to show that the injury or loss came 
[ about other than through his negligence. If this can be proved, 
i the bailee will be absolved of any blame. If, on the other hand, 
[ the bailee has a lack of knowledge, as to how the injury occur-
i red, he will be found negligent and thus responsible to the bailor. 
The reasoning behind the above discussion is explained thus-
ly: The bailee is in physical control of the animal and, as it is 
unlikely that the bailor is present when the injury occurred, it 
would be inappropriate to require the bailor to prove something 
be has no knowledge of. Also, the bailee is in possession of the 
bailed animal and may have the best or even the only knowledge 
of the events leading to the injury. 
To mollify the extreme consequence that may befall the bailee, 
a signed agreement between the parties may be helpful. If the 
bailee and bailor sign an agreement to hold the bailee harmless 
in the event of injury or death, the bailee may be released from 
• the effects of negligence, although perhaps not willful negligence. 
We have discussed the bailee's responsibilities in a bailment 
but when is the bailor liable for injuries to bailee even though 
he does not have control of the horse at the time? The majority 
of cases in this category arise out of the hiring of horses for riding. 
In horse rentals, the bailor, owner of the riding academy, war-
rants the animal will be fit for the particular purpose of the bail-
ment. One does not rent an untrained or high-spirited horse to 
a novice naer. ine warranty \Ooiimen;; is oreacnea eiixier wnen 
the bailor hfi||^pwledge of the unsuitataj^k or was negligent 
in detenninjPRe suitability of the horse ^ p l e particular rider-
bailee. 
Another basis whereby the bailor may be deemed responsible 
is where he makes explicit statements about the gentleness of the 
horse knowing this is not true. It is to be remembered that if the 
bailor has knowledge of a horse's dangerous traits and does not 
disclose this to the bailee, then he may be liable if an injury occurs. 
A further question to be answered—who is responsible if an 
injury befalls a third person by the bailed horse? Is it the bailor 
or the bailee? -
When the injury is caused solely by the negligence of the bailee, 
the bailor is not liable. However, in certain situations, the bailor 
would be liable as (1) when he had knowledge of a dangerous 
trait in the animal; (2) fails to disclose salient information to bailee 
concerning the horse; (3) state or local law imposes liability on 
the owner of the horse; and (4) bailor fails to provide an ap-
propriate horse for the bailment. 
As there is the formation of a bailment, so there is the termina-
tion of a bailment. In this respect a bailment comes to an end by 
(1) full performance of the bailment purpose; (2) mutual consent 
of the parties; (3) bailee's wrong, at the option of the bailor; (4) 
death of either party; (5) destruction of the bailed animal; or (6) 
in some instances, legal status of the parties. 
Were one to look back at early jurisprudence, mention is made 
of bailments in the Book of Exodus. Expressions such as, "If a 
man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff" or "If a man 
borrow aught of his neighbor," were bailments then and, even 
in our modern thinking, are bailments. From years back till to-
day, bailment of horses, as other goods and products, is a legal 
matter that is of importance although not too well understood by 
the legal profession and less understood by the layperson. ^ T 
PINE BAR 
1978 Red Dun 
Stud Fee: $500 
Booking Fee: $100 
/ 
Pine BAT 
Bar Plaudit 
I King Plaudit 
* Sugar Bee Bars (AQHA) 
Jokers New Dawn { * . , „ 
' i Pines Jewell* ) a (AQHA) ^ j f o T ^ a ^ - r f e ^ g l 
CONTACT: 
Double T 
Billy or Michael Thomas 
P.O. Box 2371 
Jackson. Miss. 39205 
(601) 362-3191 or (601) 856-3976 
1983 
High Point Aged Stallion 
Mississippi Appaloosa Horse Club 
19 Lifetime Halter Points 
7 Senior Western Pleasure Lifetime Points 
(Limited Showing) -,,;. 
. Managed by Ernie King . 
X V I APPALOOSA MEWS DECEMBER 1 9 8 3 9 9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f 
* ATTORNEYS 
AT 
LAW 
WINDER&HASLAM 
SUITE 4004 
175 WEST 200 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 2668 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2668 
(801) 322-2222 
A p r i l 29, 1988 
Mr. Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Smurthwaite v. Painter 
Court of Appeals No. 880073-CA 
Dear Mr. Shea: 
I represent Alfred T. Smurthwaite, the plaintiff and appel-
lant in the above-referenced case. The case was argued 
Wednesday, April 27, 1988, before a panel consisting of 
Judges Davidson, Garff, and Jackson. 
I am submitting this letter citation of supplemental 
authorities (with five copies), pursuant to Rule 24(j) of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
1. The question of whether a pasturage agreement is a rental 
arrangement or an agistment bailment arrangement (the 
question which is at the heart of this appeal) is dis-
cussed in Appellant's Brief at 9-19; Respondent's Brief 
at 5-10; and Appellant's Reply Brief at 5-7. It was 
also discussed several times during oral argument. A 
case clearly holding that a person who takes in and 
pastures animals on his land for reward is not a land-
lord but an agistor, and that the person who owns the 
animals is not a tenant or lessee is Cox v. Chase, 163 
Pac. 184 (Kan. 1917). (The earlier opinion in that 
same dispute, reported at 148 Pac. 766 (Kan. 1915) may 
also be of interest on the duty-to-notify aspect of the 
instant case; (this argued duty, and Mr. Smurthwaite1s 
contention that Mr. Painter's failure to notify him 
constituted negligence, are discussed in Appellant's 
Brief at 16-24)) . 
'Wl^^^^ ^SII)" 
!» APR 29 1988 ^ 
PETER C. COLLINS 
COURT qyjSSfti ERED 
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During oral argument, Judge Garff posed a question con-
cerning federal Bureau of Land Management and/or Utah 
Board of State Lands potential liability, by virtue of 
their putative "bailee" status, with respect to animals 
placed on public lands, by their owners, for grazing 
purposes. I indicated, in my rebuttal argument, that 
that question might be governed by statutory, or regu-
latory law. It does appear to be so governed, under 
both state and federal statutes (respectively, Utah 
Code Ann. §§4-20-1, et seq., and 65-1-44, and 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 315, et seq.); and also under state and federal regu-
lations (respectively, Utah Admin. Code R632-50-1, et 
seq., and 43 C.F.R. Parts 4100 (see, esp., 43 C.F.R. 
§§4130 and 4130.5)). 
The essence of these statutes and rules, for present 
purposes, seems to be, unlike the situation in the 
purely private context of the instant litigation, which 
arguably involves Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 (the agistor's 
lien statute), that: (1) public "grazing permit" entitle-
ments are in the nature of leases (see, Utah Code Ann. 
§65-1-44); (2) at least with respect to state lands, 
all payments are to be made in advance, and non-payment 
works a forfeiture (see, Utah Admin. Code R632-50-6); 
(3) if, at least with respect to federal lands, the 
animals are on public lands in excess of authorized 
permit use, a trespass is worked (see Holland Livestock 
Ranch v. United States, 655 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1981)); 
civil and criminal penalties may be imposed (43 C.F.R. 
§4150.1); and impoundment may be ordered (43 C.F.R. 
§4150.4); (4) apparently (our research has unearthed no 
statute, regulation, or case dealing with the question) 
no lien right is created in the government, state or 
federal, by virtue of non-payment; and (5) there is, 
apparently (we have likewise found no law on this point), 
no "bailee" liability even arguably to be imposed if 
the animals die or are injured while on the public land 
that is the subject of the permit or lease. 
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The most recent case we have unearthed, and the one 
with perhaps the clearest and most helpful discussions 
of the concept and application of burden-shifting mechan-
isms in agistment bailment cases is Gebert v. Yank, 
172 Cal. App. 3d 552, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. App. 
1985). These mechanisms are discussed in Appellant's 
Brief at 9-10 and 19-20. 
With respect to the "reasonably prudent owner" standard 
of care for agistment bailees (or "agistors") (discussed 
at page 12 of Appellant's Brief), a case whose factual 
background and legal analysis might be of particular 
interest to the Court is Nutt v. Davison, 131 Pac. 390 
(Colo. 1913). 
At the time the briefing in this case was done, it was 
unclear whether the appropriate standard of review of 
trial courts' bench trials findings of fact was the 
"substantial evidence" standard or the "clearly errone-
ous" standard. See Appellant's Brief at 23-24 with 
respect to this then-uncertainty. Pursuant to an 
amendment to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, effective January 1, 1987, it appears that 
the "clearly erroneous" standard is now the one to be 
applied. As was suggested during oral argument, 
Mr. Smurthwaite's position is that the trial court's 
Finding of Fact No. 10 (appearing at page viii of the 
Appendix to Appellant's Brief) was "clearly erroneous," 
insofar as it states that he was able "to move the 
horses in and out as he saw fit . . . " and insofar as 
it pertains to time periods including December, 1983, 
and January and February, 1984, during which he was in 
arrears on his monthly payment obligation to Mr. Painter, 
and in light of the Utah adistor's lien statute (Utah 
Code Ann., §38-2-1) and during which the horses were 
dying. 
As is made clear by such cases as Western Kane County 
Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987), "no special diference" is to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
WINDER & HASLAM 
Mr. Timothy M. Shea 
April 29, 1988 
Page 4 
accorded by the Utah appellate courts to trial courts' 
Conclusions of Law. This standard-of-review question, 
critical to the Court's determination of Mr. Smurthwaite's 
appeal, was not expressly addressed in any brief or at 
oral argument. It may be necessary, however, for this 
Court to keep it in mind as it deliberates in this 
case, in light of Mr. Smurthwaite1s contention that the 
following unnumbered "conclusions of law," discussed in 
Appellant's Brief at 20, and appearing at page xi of 
the Appendix to Appellant's Brief, were erroneous: 
The Court concludes that the agreement between 
the parties was not an agistment agreement 
which requires in all cases that the person 
sought to be charged has some contractual 
responsibility for the care of the livestock. 
The Court further concludes that the defen-
dant had no duty to care for the livestock or 
inspect the animals nor even to report on 
their condition under the circumstances of 
this case. 
Respectfully 
PETER C. COLLINS 
PCC/skt 
Enclosure (5 copies) 
cc: Taylor D. Carr 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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